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Questions relating to the allocation and management of risk have played a central role in the 
development of the National Water Initiative, particularly as it has applied to the Murray-
Darling Basin. The central issues of efficiency and equity in allocations are best understood by 
considering water licenses as bundles of state-contingent claims. The interaction of property 
rights and uncertainty regarding water flows, production and output prices is modelled using a 
state-contingent representation of production under uncertainty.  The role of technology and 
investment in the determination of efficient adaptation strategies to manage risks is explored 
using an illustrative example. 
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State-contingent modelling of the Murray Darling Basin: 
implications for the design of property rights 
The  management  of  the  Murray  Darling  Basin  plays  a  central  role  in 
environmental  policy  in  Australia.  The  economic  and  social  importance  of  the 
Basin and the complex and often intractable nature of the problems arising from 
past patterns of land and water use have  made it  a  symbol of  the success or 
failure with which  Australians  have  managed  the natural  environment  in  the 
period since European settlement. 
In  a  more  practical  sense,  policy  initatives  adopted  in  response  to  the 
problems of the Murray-Darling Basin have influenced the design of policies to 
respond to other large-scale environmental problems, such as those of the Great 
Artesian  Basin  (Tan  and  Quiggin  2004).  More  generally,  the  market-based 
approach adopted in relation to  the  Murray-Darling Basin has  been employed 
more  widely  to  deal  with  issues  such  as  climate  change.  This  suggests  the 
desirability of considering in more detail the strengths and weaknesses of such 
approaches,  and  the  issues  of  detailed  implementation  raised  by  the 
management of the the Murray-Darling Basin. 
The  central  difficulties  revolve  around  risk  and  uncertainty,  and  are 
exacerbated  by  the  vagueness  and  imprecision  that  commonly  surrounds 
discussion  of these concepts. The most satisfactory analytical framework for the 
discussion  of  these  issues  that  has  been  developed  thus  far  is  based  on  the 
concept  of  random  variables  as  vectors  of  state-contingent  outcomes,  and  the 
associated Bayesian decision theory.  
Central elements of this theory were developed by Savage (1954) in the 
context of decision theory, and Arrow (1953, 1954) and Debreu (1952, 1959) in the 
context of general equilibrium theory. Despite these early advances, little use has 
been  made  until  recently  of  state-contingent  representations  of  uncertainty  in 
applied  economic  analysis  (important  exceptions  are  Hirshleifer  (1966)  and 
Hirshleifer and Riley 1992). Chambers  and Quiggin (2000)  develop a detailed  
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state-contingent analysis of production under uncertainty and conclude that the 
state-contingent approach provides the best way to think about all problems in 
the economics of uncertainty, including problems of consumer choice, the theory of 
the firm, and principal agent relationships. 
The aim of this paper is to show how the state-contingent model may be 
used in a simulation context to model production under uncertainty. The analysis 
is applied to compare alternative specifications of water-entitlements contingent 
on available flows of water. 
The  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  General  information  on  the  Murray-
Darling Basin and the National Water Initiative is presented in Section 1. The 
state-contingent  approach  to  modelling  production  under  uncertainty  and  the 
state-contingent specification of property rights is described in Section 2.  
1. Background 
The Murray-Darling Basin encompasses a substantial proportion of the 
agricultural area of Eastern Australia, including parts of four states and the ACT. 
In addition, it is an actual or potential water source for Adelaide, Canberra, and 
Melbourne. The Snowy Mountains scheme, diverting water from the Snowy river 
to  the  Basin,  supplies  both  additional  water  for  irrigation  and  hydro-electric 
power.  There  also  exist  technical  possibilities  for  supplying  Sydney  through  a 
diversion of water from the Murrumbidgee River to the Wollondilly River in the 
catchment of Warragamba Dam, though the economic feasibility of this option 
has not been investigated in detail. Hence, the management of the resources of 
the Murray-Darling Basin is the single most important issue in Australian water 
policy.  
Quiggin  (2001)  gives  a  summary  of  the  development  of  irrigation  and 
water  policy  in  the  Murray-Darling  Basin  during  the  20th  century.  Rapid 
expansion of irrigated agriculture contributed to the development of a range of 
environmental  problems  including  salinity,  land  degradation,  and  loss  of 
biodiversity, leading to the imposition, in 1994, of a cap on diversions of water for 
irrigation. Major environmental issues are summarised by the Murray–Darling  
6 
Basin Commission (2006). 
The  most  important  developments  since  2000  have  been  the  Living 
Murray Initiative (Murray--Darling Basin Commission 2003) and the National 
Water  Initiative.  The  Council  of  Australian  Governments  (COAG)  has  taken 
central role in the design and implementation of these initiatives. 
The National Water Initiative 
The  National  Water  Initiative  (NWI)  emerged  from  the  2003  COAG 
meeting  (ref),  and  has  been  developed  further  through  the  COAG  process. 
Questions  relating  to  the  allocation  and  management  of  risk  have  played  a 
central role. 
Two major principles were announced at  the 2003  COAG meeting. The 
first was that, in future, water allocations should be stated as shares of available 
water, rather than as specific volumes. This approach deals with fluctuations in 
water  availability  by  allocating  the  total  amount  available  among  users  in 
proportion to their shares. 
The second principle concerned an approach to the allocation of risk arising 
from changes in the aggregate availability of water. Under this principle, the risk 
of  changes  in  water  availability  due  to  new  knowledge  about  the  hydrological 
capacity of the system will  be borne by users. The risk of reductions in water 
availability  arising  from  changes  in  public  policy,  such  as  changes  in 
environmental policy, will be borne by the public, and water users will receive 
compensation for such reductions. 
The principles of the National Water Initiative were elaborated in more 
detail in a statement issued by the 2004 COAG meeting (Council of Australian 
Governments  2004). The Communique  specified a framework that  assigns  the 
risk of future reductions in water availability as follows: 
•  reductions  arising  from  natural  events  such  as  climate  change,  drought  or 
bushfire to be borne by water users; 
•  reductions  arising  from  bona  fide  improvements  in  knowledge  about  water 
systems' capacity to sustain particular extraction levels to be borne by water  
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users up to 2014. After 2014, water users to bear this risk for the first three 
per  cent  reduction  in  water  allocation,  State/Territory  and  the  Australian 
Government would share (one-third and two-third shares respectively) the risk 
of reductions of between three per cent and six per cent; State/Territory and 
the Australian Government would share equally the risk of reductions above 
six per cent; 
•  reductions arising from changes in government policy not previously provided 
for would be borne by governments, and 
•  where  there  is  voluntary  agreement  between  relevant  State  or  Territory 
Governments and key stakeholders, a different risk assignment model to the 
above may be implemented. 
The state-contingent approach 
To analyze the implications of the risk allocation procedure proposed in 
the  National  Water  Initiative,  it  is  necessary  to  model  production  under 
uncertainty. A number of modelling approaches have been proposed  and used, 
including  mean-variance  analysis  (Just  and  Pope  1978),  stochastic  production 
functions  (Newbery  and  Stiglitz  1979),  parametrised  distribution  functions 
(Grossman and Hart  1983)  and the  state-contingent  approach (Chambers  and 
Quiggin 2000, Quiggin and Chambers 2006). 
All of these approaches have advantages and disadvantages. However, the 
state-contingent approach provides the most natural approach to the problem of 
designing  property  rights  and  other  market-based  instruments  for  the 
management of irrigation systems in the Murray-Darling Basin. In particular, the 
allocation of risk proposed under the National Water Initiative is most naturally 
understood in terms of the concept of state-contingent commodities, introduced by 
Arrow and Debreu. 
A  crucial  feature  of  the  state-contingent  approach  is  the  distinction 
between  exogenous  states  of  nature,  such  as  those  associated  with  climatic 
variation,  and  the  endogenous  actions  of  decision-makers.  By  contrast,  in  the 
parametrised distribution function approach, states of nature are considered to  
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be  endogenous,  in  that  the  probability  with  which  particular  states  occur  is 
determined by the actions of decision-makers. The mean–variance and stochastic 
production function approaches make no explicit reference to states of nature, and 
therefore provide no natural way of representing the distinction between changes 
in the state of nature, changes in knowledge and changes in public policy.  
State-contingent specification of water rights 
An illustration of the way in which the state-contingent approach may be 
applied to the design and analysis of property rights is provided by Freebairn and 
Quiggin (2005). Freebairn and Quiggin compare three systems of property rights 
in a model with two states of nature, corresponding to normal and drought (low-
flow) conditions. The model may be generalised to allow for more than two states 
of nature, but the two-state case captures many of the essential issues. 
The first systems of property right, considered primarily as a benchmark 
for welfare analysis is a system of contingent state claims, each of which consists 
of an entitlement to water in a specific state of nature. The second is the system 
of proportional allocations proposed under the NWI, in which a right entitles the 
holder to a given volume of water in normal conditions and a reduced volume in 
low-flow  conditions.  The  third  is  a  combination  of  high-security  rights,  which 
provide an entitlement to a given volume of water in all states and low-security 
rights which provide an entitlement to water only in normal states. 
Production in the state-contingent approach 
The state-contingent approach captures important features of production 
under uncertainty that are excluded from consideration in alternative frameworks 
such as  the  stochastic production function, which is effectively equivalent  to  a 
fixed-output-proportions technology (Chambers and Quiggin 2000). In particular, 
in the state-contingent framework it is possible to represent production decisions 
that have the effect of increasing output in some states of nature and reducing it 
in others. 
This flexibility is crucial to the modelling of issues relating to irrigation 
and water management. One of the central goals of irrigation is to manage the  
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risk  associated  with variable  supplies  of  water  by  storing water  in wet  years 
(favourable  states of nature) and using it in dry years (unfavourable  states of 
nature). The allocation of effort to irrigation produces an increase in output in 
unfavourable states of nature at the expense of a loss of output in favourable 
states of nature. Irrigation is beneficial if the increase in the (risk-adjusted) value 
of  output  in  unfavourable  states  is  greater  than  the  corresponding  loss  in 
favourable states.  
The model 
The model is a development of that described by Adamson, Quiggin and 
Mallawaarachchi  (2005).  A  programming  approach  is  used  to  model  the 
allocation of land and water resources within a river system, designed to simulate 
the Murray-Darling Basin. The river system is divided into regions m = 1...K. The 
system is modelled as a directed network, as in Hall et al. 1993. 
Agricultural  land  and  water  use  in  each  region  is  modelled  by  a 
representative farmer with agricultural land area Lk. There are S possible states 
of nature corresponding to different levels of rainfall/snowmelt and other climatic 
conditions. The status of the river in each region and state of nature is measured 
by a flow variable and a salinity variable (salinity is taken as a proxy for other 
measures of water quality, since most such measures are reduced by excessive 
extractions. The 2 × K×S vector of status variables is determined endogenously by 
water use decisions. 
There are M distinct agricultural commodities, and therefore M×S different 
state-contingent  commodities.  In  addition  to  water,  where  the  usage  level  is 
determined after the state of nature is known, there are N inputs, committed 
before the state of nature is known. Each commodity may be produced using one or 
more  activities.  In  particular,  we  consider  alternative  production  technologies 
involving higher and lower, or fixed and flexible, levels of water use. The total 
number  of  activities  is  given  by J. Each activity requires  a  state-independent 
choice of N inputs. Urban water use in Adelaide is modelled separately and an 
environmental value is imputed to residual flows to the sea.  
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Solution concepts 
A number of solution concepts may be considered for the model. The first is 
global optimization of returns from the system as a whole, included the expected 
profit  of  agricultural  enterprises  and  the  value  of  water  in  urban  and 
environmental uses. Thus, it is the solution that would be adopted by a social 
planner whose objective is to maximising social returns. Adamson, Quiggin and 
Mallawaarachchi  (2005)  discuss  this  solution,  which  is  primarily  used  as  a 
benchmark for the assessment of alternative policy options.  
In practice, water usage is not determined centrally, but by the actions of 
individual  water  users,  constrained  by  a  system  of  rights  and  licenses.  This 
outcome can be modelled using a sequential solution concept. Sequential solution 
concepts involves optimisation within each region, with allowable water use being 
determined by an allocation of water rights. Since the quantity and quality of 
water in any given region is determined by upstream usage, the model must be 
solved sequentially, beginning with upstream regions. 
The  simplest  case  of  the  sequential  solution,  analyzed  in  Adamson, 
Quiggin and Mallawaarachchi (2005) is that of riparian rights, where users in 
each region can extract as much water as they wish, subject to the constraint that 
extractions  cannot  exceed  the volume  of  water  flowing  through  the region.  For 
most  regions,  this  constraint  is  not  binding,  since  limits  on  the  area  of  land 
suitable for irrigated cropping provide a binding constraint. 
In Australian water management, the riparian concept derived from the 
very  different  conditions  prevailing  in  Britain  has  been  replaced  by  a  system 
under  which  all  water  is  publicly  owned,  and  water  use  is  determined  by 
allocations  of  rights.  Realistic  modelling  requires  that  these  rights  should  be 
incorporated into the constraints of the model. 
By definition, the globally optimal solution must yield an aggregate return 
at least as high as that of any sequential solution. The gap between the two is an 
indication  of  the  social  loss  arising  from  an  inefficient  allocation  of  property 
rights.  
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Modelling the design of property rights 
The constrained-optimal sequential solution is derived for the case when 
the  only  restriction  on  water  use  is  an  aggregate  constraint  for  each  region, 
consisting  of  a  state-contingent  allocation  of  water.  Thus,  water  rights  (as 
opposed to aggregate availability of water) do not introduce relevant constraints 
on  land  allocation.  This  is  the  solution  that  would  arise  in  the  presence  of 
complete markets for state-contingent water rights (Freebairn and Quiggin 2006). 
The  constrained-optimal  sequential  solution  also  arises  when  there  is 
unrestricted, and costless, temporary water trade within regions. 
A more realistic specification involves the creation of two classes of water 
rights, one giving high security and the other giving low security. Since the number 
of classes of rights is less than the number of states in the model, the resulting 
assets do not span the state space and markets are incomplete. 
The two-class rights structure may be modelled by imposing a constraint 
for  each  technology  in  any  region  requiring  that  its  allocation  of  rights  be 
sufficient to meet the water requirements in each state of nature. The aggregate 
allocation of rights is determined by creating high-security rights equal  to  the 
aggregate allocation of water in the worst state of nature (the drought state) and 
low security rights equal to the difference between the aggregate allocation in the 
normal state and the aggregate allocation in the drought state. 
Proportional  water  rights  work  by  scaling  down  the  water  available  in 
proportion to the aggregate availability for the region in question. This may be 
modelled by assuming that there is a single water input, namely a proportional 
water right. For each technology, the water input requirement generates  three 
constraints, one for each state of nature 
Given proportional water rights for technologies he constraint associated 
with the drought state will be binding, with an inflexible demand for water, but 
for  technologies  that  switch  to  dryland  agriculture  in  the  drought  state,  the 




Results  of  simulations  for  three  sequential  solution  concepts  are 
presented  in  Tables  1-4.  Table  1  shows  the  sequential  solution  with  no 
restrictions other than those associated with the CAP. This is the solution that 
would arise with costless and unrestricted water trade within regions. Table 2 
shows the sequential solution with high security and low security water rights 
and  no  trade.  Table  3  shows  the  sequential  solution  with  proportional  water 
rights  and  no  trade.  Tables  1a-3a  show  state-contingent  values  of  water  use, 
salinity and value added for the three solutions in turn, while Tables 1b-3b show 
land allocations for the same solutions. Table 4 is a comparative summary of 
expected returns for the three simulations. 
Consider first, the summary results presented in Table 4.  The highest 
expected value arises for the sequential solution with unrestricted intra-regional 
trade. This is unsurprising, since it would normally be expected that the removal 
of constraints will allow a higher value of the objective function. However, since 
this  is  a  second-best  solution,  with  no  account  being  taken  of  externalities 
between upstream and downstream users, such an outcome is not guaranteed. 
This point may be illustrated by consideration of the regional results. The 
unrestricted  solution  gives  the  highest  values  of  the  objective  function  for 
upstream regions (those with no preceding region in the network). However, it 
gives  lower  values  for  some  downstream  regions  than  the  solution  with  high 
security and low security rights and lower values for Adelaide than the solution 
with proportional property rights. 
The results for the solution with high security and low security rights are 
fairly similar to those with unrestricted trade. This reflects the observation of 
Freebairn and Quiggin (2006) that the availability of water rights with high and 
low  security  will  reduce  the  need  for  trade.  Although  two  water  rights  are 
insufficient to span the state space with three states of nature, the deviation from 
complete spanning is modest.  
It is possible that this result would change if a more realistic model, with 
a large number of states of nature, were used. However, experience has suggested  
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that, in most cases, modelling more than three states of nature (or using fourth 
and higher-order moments in a moment-based representation of uncertainty) has 
little effect on results, and may introduce additional error due to the need to make 
distributional assumptions on the basis of limited evidence. 
The  solution  with  proportional  water  rights  and  no  trade  produces  a 
signficant reduction in the value of the objective function and more variable water 
use. However, because water use varies positively with flows, the variability of 
salinity is reduced in this solution, as is the maximum level of salinity, occurring 
in the drought state. 
Simulations of land allocation are presented in Tables 1b-3b. As noted 
above, differences between the unrestricted-trade sequential solution (Table 1b) 
and  the  solution  with  high-priority  and  low-priority  rights  (Table  2b)  are 
relatively modest. The solution with proportional rights shows more substantial 
differences 
First, there is a substantial decline in the area planted to citrus, and stone 
fruits  are  eliminated  altogether.  These  high-value  crops  depend  on  a  reliable 
supply  of  water,  and  thus  require  a  large  purchase  of  rights  to  guarantee  an 
adequate supply of water in drought years. In the absence of a capacity to sell 
excess water in normal years, the activities are unprofitable. Thus, the result may 
be interpreted as implying that, with proportional water rights, the viability of 
stone  fruit  and  citrus  activities  will  depend  on  the  presence  of  smoothly 
functioning markets. 
Second, rice is grown in the Murrumbidgee region, whereas in the other two 
solutions  rice  is  displaced  by  a  mixture  of  cotton  and  irrigated  wheat.  This 
apparently  reflects  model  assumptions  about  crop  rotation,  under  which  the 
proportional water allocation is well suited to the rice activity. 
Finally, under the proportional  solution, salinity levels  at  Adelaide  are 
generally lower, reflecting reduced upstream water use. Water use in Adelaide 
and the social value of water are correspondingly higher. 
Discussion  
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The results presented above illustrate a number of important issues in the 
policy debate. First, the state-contingent specification of water rights can make a 
substantial  difference  to  resource  allocation  and  environmental  outcomes. 
Proportional rights allocations have both advantages and disadvantages, as do 
systems of high security and low security rights.  
In the past, New South Wales has favoured a mixture of  high security and 
low security rights while  Victoria has favoured proportional rights. One of the 
issues under discussion in the development of the National Water Initiative 
An important implication of the  model results presented  above is  that 
farmers adapt their production plans to the state-contingent structure of property 
rights.  This  adaptation will,  in general,  involved capital  investment  decisions. 
Unanticipated  changes  in  the  structure  of  property  rights  will  therefore,  in 
general, reduce the value of existing investments.  
This does not mean that existing policies should remain unchanged or that 
existing  investments  should  be  protected  by  ‘grandfather  clauses’  and  similar 
devices  from  any  possibility  of  loss  due  to  policy  change.  On  the  other  hand, 
administrative  neatness  is  not  a  sufficient  justification  for  policy  change. 
Similarly,  given  the  limited  development  of  markets  for  trade  between 
catchments  within  states,  it  seems  premature  to  require  standardisation  of 
property rights in the hope that this will promote interstate trade. 
A  second  implication,  previously  derived  in  a  theoretical  model  by 
Freebairn and Quiggin (2005) is that a system of rights based on proportional 
shares in a state-contingent aggregate allocation is likely to require substantial 
temporary  trade  if  it  is  to  function  effectively.  This  in  turn  may  generate 
significant transactions costs. 
Modelling 
Some points regarding modelling are also worthy of discussion. The issue 
of  representing  uncertainty  in  simulation  models  based  on  a  programming 
approach has been debated for many years and a variety of solutions have been 
proposed. Most of these solutions involve a two-stage procedure, either adding  
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stochastic  uncertainty  to  the  results  of  a  deterministic  model  or  deriving  an 
uncertain probability distribution from many runs of a deterministic model. 
By  contrast,  the  state-contingent  approach  allows  uncertainty  to  be 
incorporated within the standard linear programming framework. The main cost 
is an expansion of the dimensionality of the model to allow production activities 
to  generate  a  vector  of  state-contingent  outputs  rather  than  one  or  more 
deterministic  outputs.  As  computing  power  increases,  this  cost  becomes  less 
significant. 
An  important  advantage  arising  from  the  consistency  of  the  state 
contingent approach with standard linear programming is that outputs such as 
shadow  prices  and  sensitivity  analyses,  routinely  generated  by  linear 
programming packages, can be obtained. Furthermore, as observed by Chambers 
and Quiggin (2000),  the duality relationships of  modern production theory are 
entirely  applicable  to  state-contingent  production.  Hence,  the  dual  variables 
derived from a linear programming analysis can be interpreted in the usual way. 
A second important advantage is illustrated in the present study. Policy 
problems  involving  uncertainty  and  contingent  policy  responses  commonly 
generate a natural state-contingent representation as in the present case. It is 
rare,  by  contrast,  for  policy  proposals  to  be  framed  in  terms  of  probability 
distributions and correlations, as is required in common stochastic approaches. 
Risk aversion 
The  model  solutions  presented  here  maximize  an  expected  return,  and 
therefore  imply  risk  neutrality.  However,  risk-averse  behavior  can  easily  be 
incorporated in the model using the idea of risk-neutral probabilities. These are 
the betting odds for state-contingent claims that would be accepted by risk-averse 
investors given their state-contingent distribution of wealth.  
Risk-neutral  probabilities  can  be  determined  iteratively  in  the  state-
contingent framework. The simplest procedure is to derive a risk-neutral solution 
given the objective probabilities, compute the risk-neutral probabilities for the 
resulting wealth distribution, then proceed iteratively.  
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As  Pannell (2004) points out,  the optimal  allocation of resources  is, in 
general, not highly sensitive to risk aversion in cases of this kind. Hence, a couple 
of iterations will probably be sufficient to yield a reasonably accurate solution. 
Concluding comments 
As the role of market-based instruments in environmental management 
continues  to grow, the specification of property rights will  become  increasingly 
important. Since property rights are typically specified as bundles of contingent 
claims and obligations, formal modelling of the specification of property rights is 
most  naturally  undertaken  in  a  state-contingent  framework.  This  approach 
allows for a seamless integration of the description of property rights and the 
modelling of production responses under uncertainty. 
In the case of the Murray-Darling Basin, the analysis here suggests that 
alternative choices for the specification of property rights may have significant 
implications for resource allocation and environmental outcomes. Thus far, it does 
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Table 1a: Values of state-contingent solution variables: Sequential solution with spanning 
 
    Water Use (GL)   
Salinity 
(mg/L)     
Return ($m) 
 
Catchment  Normal  Drought  Wet  Normal  Drought  Wet  Normal  Drought  Wet  Average 
Condamine  123.0  73.8  123.0  29.1  48.9  24.4  99.9  58.7  141.6  104.2 
Border Rivers(Q)  89.0  53.4  89.0  74.0  124.4  62.2  99.2  58.3  148.3  105.8 
Warrego-Paroo  3.5  3.5  3.5  94.3  163.7  81.8  1.8  1.8  2.8  2.1 
Namoi  527.0  316.2  527.0  154.1  259.2  129.6  101.0  63.7  150.6  108.4 
Central West  482.0  289.2  482.0  124.3  211.5  105.7  142.7  75.3  239.0  158.1 
Maranoa-Balonne  24.1  24.1  24.1  41.5  65.8  34.2  12.3  12.5  19.4  14.5 
Border Rivers(N)  531.0  318.6  531.0  110.9  183.7  92.1  112.4  68.3  171.3  121.3 
Western  110.2  110.2  110.2  228.6  369.6  182.6  18.6  18.6  36.4  23.9 
Lachlan  375.0  225.0  375.0  353.6  594.1  297.1  93.6  45.2  169.6  106.7 
Murrumbidgee  1,498.6  1,204.2  1,498.6  24.0  40.4  20.2  376.4  233.6  655.2  431.5 
North East  97.5  98.3  98.3  38.9  65.7  32.8  101.9  47.7  191.8  118.0 
Goulburn-Broken  1,047.0  628.2  1,052.7  134.1  225.5  112.7  340.1  157.4  638.9  393.2 
Wimmera  103.0  61.8  103.6  530.1  1089.0  544.5  11.2  3.7  24.9  13.8 
North Central  82.0  49.2  82.3  319.2  587.8  291.1  43.4  22.5  74.8  48.6 
Murray  903.0  541.8  903.0  226.3  381.7  189.2  103.4  70.4  174.4  118.1 
Mallee  53.0  31.8  53.0  442.3  743.5  365.6  37.5  13.5  71.3  42.8 
Lower Murray 
Darling 
87.0  52.2  87.0  410.3  697.1  333.3  35.1  -9.9  99.0  45.3 
SA MDB  302.2  302.2  302.2  548.0  927.0  444.8  185.6  0.2  462.5  231.6 






      1,979.2  1,004.3  3,534.9  2,251.0 
                     
Note: Flows to Sea  14,562.3  8,149.4  18,010.6  603.8  1015.4  488.3          
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Table 1b: Land allocations (‘000 ha): Sequential solution with spanning 
 











water  Return   Salinity 
Condamine        3.4           21.2                 104.2  31.66 
Border Rivers 
(Q)     5.3              17.3                 105.8  80.56 
Warrego-Paroo                    0.7                 2.1  104.45 
Namoi        0.5           74.9                 108.4  167.77 
Central West        8.1           57.3                 158.1  136.19 
Maranoa-
Balonne                    4.8                 14.5  44.16 
Border Rivers 
(N)     0.0  1.8           74.6                 121.3  119.83 
Western                    15.7                 23.9  242.98 
Lachlan     10.1              37.8                 106.7  384.73 
Murrumbidgee     30.5                    337.4           431.5  26.10 
North East           5.2                 12.8        118.0  42.45 
Goulburn-
Broken           14.7              108.9  107.5        393.2  146.00 
Wimmera        1.2                 10.7  11.2        13.8  646.19 
North Central        4.0                 8.5  5.5        48.6  364.49 
Murray     5.8                    222.6           118.1  246.24 
Mallee        5.8                 5.4           42.8  479.56 
Lower MD        10.4                 8.9           45.3  444.57 
SA MDB        55.0                             231.6  592.82 
Adelaide                                   123.6  63.0  624.75 





Table 2a: Values of state-contingent solution variables: Priority rights solution 
 
    Water Use (GL)   
Salinity 
(mg/L)     
Return ($m) 
 
Catchment  Normal  Drought  Wet  Normal  Drought  Wet  Normal  Drought  Wet  Average 
Condamine  123.0  61.5  123.0  29.1  48.9  24.4  99.0  54.3  137.1  101.5 
Border Rivers(Q)  89.0  44.5  89.0  74.0  124.4  62.2  99.3  54.0  145.6  104.1 
Warrego-Paroo  3.5  3.5  3.5  94.3  163.7  81.8  1.8  1.8  2.8  2.1 
Namoi  527.0  263.5  527.0  154.1  259.2  129.6  101.0  55.1  140.7  103.7 
Central West  482.0  241.0  482.0  124.3  211.5  105.7  142.9  68.8  230.7  154.4 
Maranoa-Balonne  24.1  24.1  24.1  41.5  64.2  34.2  12.3  12.5  19.4  14.5 
Border Rivers(N)  531.0  265.5  531.0  110.9  182.2  92.1  112.4  59.6  161.4  116.6 
Western  110.2  110.2  110.2  228.6  343.7  182.6  18.6  18.6  36.4  23.9 
Lachlan  375.0  187.5  375.0  353.6  594.1  297.1  93.6  42.1  164.1  104.5 
Murrumbidgee  1,498.6  1,003.5  1,498.6  24.0  40.4  20.2  370.0  223.4  627.5  418.0 
North East  97.5  98.3  98.3  38.9  65.7  32.8  101.9  47.7  191.8  118.0 
Goulburn-Broken  649.0  628.2  655.0  134.1  225.5  112.7  327.8  152.2  619.8  380.3 
Wimmera  63.9  61.8  64.4  530.1  1089.0  544.5  10.0  3.2  23.0  12.5 
North Central  51.0  49.2  51.3  303.7  587.8  277.9  39.0  3.8  91.9  47.8 
Murray  903.0  451.5  903.0  216.0  381.7  181.7  100.5  65.8  161.9  112.0 
Mallee  34.0  31.8  34.0  421.0  733.6  350.2  40.2  10.5  69.6  43.1 
Lower Murray 
Darling 
43.5  43.5  43.5  396.3  664.5  323.3  31.7  -5.1  86.7  40.8 
SA MDB  280.5  280.5  280.5  528.1  881.8  430.7  200.8  23.1  466.4  244.9 






      1,965.0  953.5  3,439.4  2,205.0 
                     





Table 2b: Land allocations (‘000 ha): Sequential solution with priority rights 
 













($m)   Salinity 
Condamine     3.4              24.3                 101.5  31.66 
Border Rivers 
(Q)     5.3              17.3                 104.1  80.56 
Warrego-Paroo                    0.7                 2.1  104.45 
Namoi        0.5           74.9                 103.7  167.77 
Central West        8.1           57.3                 154.4  136.19 
Maranoa-
Balonne                    4.8                 14.5  43.83 
Border Rivers 
(N)     0.0  1.8           74.6                 116.6  119.54 
Western                    15.7                 23.9  237.78 
Lachlan     10.1              37.8                 104.5  384.73 
Murrumbidgee     30.5                    337.4           418.0  26.10 
North East           5.2                 12.8        118.0  42.45 
Goulburn-
Broken           14.7                 113.0        380.3  146.00 
Wimmera        1.2                    11.8        12.5  646.19 
North Central           4.0                 4.8        47.8  352.78 
Murray     5.8                    222.6           112.0  238.84 
Mallee        6.2                             43.1  462.27 
Lower MD        8.7                             40.8  428.02 
SA MDB        51.0                             244.9  569.59 
Adelaide                                   123.6  62.2  597.47 







Table 3a: Values of state-contingent solution variables: Proportional rights solution 
 
    Water Use (GL)   
Salinity 
(mg/L)     
Return ($m) 
 
Catchment  Normal  Drought  Wet  Normal  Drought  Wet  Normal  Drought  Wet  Average 
Condamine  123.0  10.1  126.4  29.1  48.9  24.2  99.6  16.6  117.9  88.5 
Border Rivers(Q)  89.0  21.2  94.3  74.0  124.4  61.6  86.1  35.7  110.4  83.3 
Warrego-Paroo  3.5  0.0  3.5  94.3  163.7  77.8  1.8  -0.3  1.8  1.4 
Namoi  527.0  1.6  527.5  154.1  259.2  128.1  101.0  -78.2  103.7  66.0 
Central West  482.0  24.3  490.1  124.3  211.5  103.1  142.0  -36.8  186.1  119.5 
Maranoa-Balonne  24.1  0.0  24.1  41.5  57.7  34.3  12.3  -2.5  12.5  9.4 
Border Rivers(N)  531.0  5.6  532.9  110.9  178.6  92.1  112.4  -71.9  121.8  78.4 
Western  94.0  0.0  94.0  228.6  252.2  179.7  17.4  -16.1  22.2  12.1 
Lachlan  375.0  0.0  373.7  353.6  594.1  294.0  84.9  -150.5  209.8  75.3 
Murrumbidgee  2,007.0  1,204.2  2,403.9  24.0  40.4  19.9  352.8  194.5  572.6  387.1 
North East  90.4  66.9  108.2  38.9  65.7  32.4  72.5  35.0  106.5  75.2 
Goulburn-Broken  1,047.0  628.2  1,254.7  134.1  225.5  111.5  270.3  32.3  442.2  274.3 
Wimmera  78.6  61.8  94.0  530.1  1089.0  421.9  11.3  -34.5  28.9  7.4 
North Central  82.0  49.2  98.3  309.4  587.8  252.3  45.7  -9.5  78.3  44.5 
Murray  903.0  541.8  1,079.1  225.4  379.9  188.1  87.1  -90.6  193.4  83.4 
Mallee  53.0  31.8  63.6  440.7  739.7  368.5  61.7  -41.6  123.5  59.6 
Lower Murray 
Darling  86.9  36.8  104.4  420.8  611.6  347.1  37.1  -69.7  119.4  40.4 
SA MDB  302.2  181.3  362.7  563.0  809.8  465.4  162.3  -324.1  524.2  173.6 
Adelaide  0.0  0.0  0.0  595.4  836.2  494.4  94.8  94.8  94.8  94.8 
TOTAL  
6,898.
6  2,864.8 
7,835.
1           1,853.3  -517.5  3,170.0  1,774.1 
                         







Table 3b: Land allocations (‘000 ha): Sequential solution with proportional rights 
 













($m)   Salinity 
Condamine        3.4           21.2                 88.5  31.6 
Border Rivers 
(Q)     5.3              12.5                 83.3  80.4 
Warrego-Paroo                    0.7                 1.4  103.2 
Namoi        0.5           74.9                 66.0  167.3 
Central West        8.1           57.3                 119.5  135.4 
Maranoa-
Balonne                    4.8                 9.4  42.6 
Border Rivers 
(N)  0.1     1.7           74.5                 78.4  118.8 
Western                 0.4  13.1                 12.1  218.6 
Lachlan                 10.1  32.0                 75.3  383.8 
Murrumbidgee     30.5                 246.0  19.8           387.1  26.0 
North East        5.2                    12.8        75.2  42.3 
Goulburn-
Broken        14.7                 62.9  148.6        274.3  145.6 
Wimmera        1.2                    14.8        7.4  609.4 
North Central        4.0                 3.9  9.2        44.5  347.9 
Murray     5.8                    59.7  142.8        83.4  245.1 
Mallee        9.6                             59.6  478.9 
Lower MD        12.3                 6.5           40.4  436.8 
SA MDB        55.0                             173.6  583.1 
Adelaide                                   206.0  94.8  613.2 







Table 4: Comparative values of objective function values 
 
  Expected return ($m) for solutions   
Catchment  Spanning  Priority rights  Proportional 
Condamine  104.2  101.5  88.5 
Border Rivers(Q)  105.8  104.1  83.3 
Warrego-Paroo  2.1  2.1  1.4 
Namoi  108.4  103.7  66.0 
Central West  158.1  154.4  119.5 
Maranoa-Balonne  14.5  14.5  9.4 
Border Rivers(N)  121.3  116.6  78.4 
Western  23.9  23.9  12.1 
Lachlan  106.7  104.5  75.3 
Murrumbidgee  431.5  418.0  387.1 
North East  118.0  118.0  75.2 
Goulburn-Broken  393.2  380.3  274.3 
Wimmera  13.8  12.5  7.4 
North Central  48.6  47.8  44.5 
Murray  118.1  112.0  83.4 
Mallee  42.8  43.1  59.6 
Lower Murray 
Darling 
45.3  40.8 
40.4 
SA MDB  231.6  244.9  173.6 
Adelaide  63.0  62.2  94.8 
TOTAL   2,251.0  2,205.0  1,774.1 
 
 
 